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Abstract
On April 20, 2005, the President of the United States signed a sweeping
legislative overhaul of the consumer bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy reform
legislation is based on an empirical assertion: that sophisticated debtors with the means to
re-pay their debts were instead filing for bankruptcy and acquiring a discharge, thereby
abusing the bankruptcy system.
This Article presents the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy court
doctrine in consumer exemptions proceedings over a twenty-year period. The findings
suggest a serious empirical flaw in the premise of the bankruptcy reform legislation. The
study shows that the bankruptcy system minimizes abuse by valuing property exemptions
to decrease the amount of the discharge for sophisticated debtors and increase the amount
of the discharge for unsophisticated debtors. The data show that the presence of
sophistication reduces a debtor’s chance of success in an exemptions proceeding by as
much as 87.8%. Courts systematically value exemptions to impose costs on the “canpay” debtor. This pattern of abuse minimization emerged endogenously, without the
prompting of hierarchical, exogenous forces such as Congressional or appellate court
directives.
These findings suggest that Congress has misunderstood the complex nature of
the bankruptcy system, misdiagnosed the problem of consumer credit, and applied the
wrong remedy. The Article concludes with a preliminary attempt to re-focus analysis of
debt regulation around a “no-fault” .
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BANKRUPTCY ABUSE:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER EXEMPTIONS CASES*
Bernard Trujillo**

INTRODUCTION: THE RHETORIC OF ABUSE
We all know the story about middle class consumers. Here is a group that spends
too much on fancy cars, restaurant meals, and bottled water. And when they have
stretched it too thin for too long they waltz into bankruptcy court and wipe their debts
away. Over-consumption, followed by bankruptcy abuse: This is the one-two punch that
irresponsible consumers have been laying on the rest of us, and Congress finally acted to
put a stop to it.
So the story goes. The data, however, go in a different direction. This Article
reports the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy court doctrine in consumer
exemptions proceedings over a twenty-year period. The results of this study challenge a
key assumption of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”) and suggest that the bankruptcy system has been effectively minimizing
potential abuse.
Enacted on April 20, 2005, BAPCPA works the most significant changes in the
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U.S. bankruptcy system in over a quarter of a century. BAPCPA is grounded on the
claim that consumers strategically abuse the bankruptcy system by discharging debts that
they are capable of paying. Congressional rhetoric summarizes the conceptual
underpinnings of BAPCPA. Witness a press release from Sen. Orrin Hatch on the day
BAPCPA passed the Senate:
“This bill is about fairness and accountability. Bankruptcy claims have
skyrocketed since the last major bankruptcy reform bill in 1978. We all know
about the abuses of the system. Well, that is about to change for the better. This
bill may not lead to a severe reduction in the number of bankruptcies, but I do
believe that it will reduce the number of fraudulent and abusive filings….”1
On the day BAPCPA became law, Sen. Hatch continued, “The underlying idea is simple
– if you can pay, then you should pay. Too many people have abused the system in the
past, and everyone else had to shoulder their debt for them.”2 The same day, Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist opined,
“The bankruptcy reform bill marks a major step towards eliminating abuses in our
court system and ensures that those who have the means will repay their debts.
These reforms will lower the burden on all Americans who are currently paying
the price for these abuses in the form of higher interest rates, higher down
payments and higher costs of goods and services. I’m proud of this victory for
personal responsibility and fairness.”3
Behind this rhetoric of abuse is an empirical assertion: the population of debtors
filing for bankruptcy had changed in the past several years, and the bankruptcy system
had failed to keep up with the changes. The legislation assumes that debtors have
become more sophisticated, more practiced at taking strategic action. Debtors with “the

1

Press Release, “Bankruptcy Reform Passes Senate”, March 10, 2005. Website of Senator Orrin Hatch,
http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id=1303
2
Press Release, “Bankruptcy Reform Signed Into Law”, April 20, 2005. Website of Senator Orrin Hatch,
http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id1327
3
Press Release, “Frist Applauds Signing of Bankruptcy Bill”, April 20, 2005. Website of Sen. Bill Frist,
http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1914&Month=4&Ye
ar=2005
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means [to] repay their debts” (using the language of Majority Leader Frist) were instead
choosing to file for bankruptcy and shift their costs to the general population of credit
consumers. The bankruptcy system, according to the legislative imagination, failed to
adjust to this new population of scheming debtors and guilelessly awarded a discharge to
all debtors who asked for one. Because the bankruptcy system had failed to organize
itself on this important matter of abuse-prevention, Congress would have to step in and
exogenously re-order the bankruptcy system to minimize abuse.
Against Congress’ vision of the consumer bankruptcy system as a simple
discharge machine, this Article offers a counter-description: bankruptcy is a complex,
adaptive system that demonstrates patterns of self-organization according to a complex
dynamics.4 Patterns emerged in this complex system that effectively regulate potential
abuse of the discharge.
Part I of this Article reviews the arguments regarding debtors’ alleged abuse of
the bankruptcy discharge and BAPCPA’s attempt at remedy. Part II frames an empirical
test of the “abuse” hypothesis and Part III presents the results of an empirical study
measuring the bankruptcy system’s control of potential abuse. This Article concludes
with a preliminary attempt to re-cast the project of debt regulation as a “no-fault” system.

I. THE ABUSE HYPOTHESIS
Analysis of consumer bankruptcy tends to begin with the question: What explains
the sharp increase in bankruptcy filings? Filings rose from 200,000 in 1978 (the date of

4

See Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 483 (2004); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in
Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. --- (forthcoming, Dec. 2005).
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the last major revision of the U.S. bankruptcy laws) to 1.6 million in 2004.5 Two schools
have arisen to explain this spike. One school argues that changes in borrower behavior
explain the rise in bankruptcies. The other school looks to changes in lender behavior.
The “borrower behavior” school argues that recent years have seen an increase in
the dual phenomena of over-consumption and bankruptcy abuse. Middle class
consumers, on this view, spend beyond their means and otherwise court financial ruin.
When ruin comes, these consumers choose to file bankruptcy rather than cut their
expenses or take on a second (or third) job.6
The “lender behavior” school argues that the real sea-change in consumer credit
has been on the lenders’ side. The past several years have seen an unprecedented amount
of innovation in the types of consumer credit instruments available, and in the
distribution of those instruments to consumers who previously had very limited access to
the credit markets. The obvious example is the credit card, an instrument whose surge in
distribution correlates strongly with a subsequent surge in bankruptcy filings.7 But other
forms of innovation in consumer credit instruments and distribution also abound.8
This Article will return to the arguments of the “lender behavior” school.9 I

5

Timothy Egan, Debtors in Rush to Bankruptcy as Change Nears, NEW YORK TIMES August 21, 2005.
The article projects that the filings could reach 1.8 million for 2005.
6
See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, NORTHWESTERN L. REV.
(forthcoming, 2005); Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, WASH.
& LEE L. REV. (forthcoming, 2005); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time For Means-Testing, 1999
BYU L. REV 177 (1999).
7
See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy, (2005 draft, available on SSRN).
Mann’s excellent study uses data from five nations (Australia, Canada, Japan, UK and US) and finds a
strong correlation between credit card debt and, lagging by 1-2 years, bankruptcies. See also Robert M.
Lawless, The Relationship between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings and Various Basic Measures of
Consumer Debt (2002 e-article) (showing bankruptcy filings are higher for revolving consumer credit
instruments (e.g. credit cards) than for total consumer credit). See generally, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit
Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (1997).
8
An important recent arena for such consumer credit innovation is the home-loan market. See e.g. Edmund
L. Andrews, A Hands-Off Policy on Mortgage Loans, NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 2005.
9
See infra TAN 45-46 (considering a “no-fault” approach to debt regulation).
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believe it is crucial to consider what role is appropriate to government in regulating a
lending environment characterized by profuse innovation of, and broad access to,
consumer credit instruments.
For now, it is sufficient to observe that BAPCPA is almost entirely animated by
blame-the-borrower logic. The most heralded change that BAPCPA makes to the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is the imposition of a new “means-test.”10 Convinced that
the bankruptcy system failed to separate debtors with means from debtors without means,
Congress added a new sub-section of byzantine proportions to section 707 of the Code.11
This “means-test” is designed to perform a gate-keeping function – identifying debtors
who can repay and barring their access to a chapter 7 discharge.12
The “borrower behavior” school has thus fared well in the halls of Congress. But
how do the claims of that school withstand empirical analysis? The charge that debtors
court financial ruin via over-consumption, the first prong of the “borrower behavior”
story, is withering beneath the light of empirical scrutiny. Work by Elizabeth Warren and
her colleagues has shown that charges of over-consumption have little basis in fact.13
10

For discussions of earlier versions of the means-test, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer
Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 48 (2001); Jean Braucher & Mooney, Means
Measurement Rather Than Means-Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect from Can Pay Consumer
Debtors After Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (2003); Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in
Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s
Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (1998).
11
The gist of the new 707(b)(2) is to establish a chapter 7 debtor’s monthly income and subtract a set of
allowed deductions. If the amount remaining exceeds $166.66, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption
that the debtor’s petition for a chapter 7 discharge constitutes “abuse.” The debtor’s case (unless the
presumption is overcome) will be then be dismissed or converted to a chapter 13. A debtor whose income
is below the median income for the state in which the petition is filed is carved out of the means-test. See
707(b)(2) of the Code, as amended April 20, 2005. See generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer
Bankruptcy Effects of 2005 Reform Legislation, available at www.abiworld.org/pdfs/s256/mainpoints6.pdf
12
Prior to BAPCPA, a consumer debtor could elect to file for either a liquidation under chapter 7 or a debt
reorganization (which requires monthly payments of debts over a 3 to 5 year period) under chapter 13.
After BAPCPA, debtors who are found to have the means to repay will be denied access to chapter 7, either
forcing them into a chapter 13 repayment plan or forcing them out of bankruptcy.
13
Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82
WASH. U. L. Q. 1485 (2004); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
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How fares the second prong of the blame-the-borrower story? Are debtors
abusing bankruptcy by discharging debts they could repay? Prior studies have explored
the existence of abuse by looking to the central characteristics of the debtor population.
If debtors who could pay their debts (“Can-Pays” in the vernacular of the literature) were
filing for bankruptcy, then there was abuse of the discharge.14 If debtors who could not
pay their debts were filing for bankruptcy, then there was no abuse of the discharge.15
This approach of establishing abuse by elaborating debtor characteristics tends
assume a straight line from filing to discharge: if “can’t-pay” debtors are filing, then the
system serves the public interest; if “can-pay” debtors are filing, then the system is being
abused. But this straight-line approach ignores the complexity of the bankruptcy system
itself.16
The bankruptcy system is an intermediating institution standing between the
debtor and the discharge. This system is “complex”, in a sense of that term that is
borrowed from the “complexity science” methodologies common in physics and the
natural sciences. A complex system manifests a non-linearity, or a disproportion between

WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE BROKE (2003); David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth
Warren, Deborah Thorne, & Steffie Woolhandler, MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, February 2005; Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American
Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2004).
14
Ernst & Young, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitioners’ Repayment Ability Under H.R. 833: The National
Perspective, 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 79 (1999) (study, funded by VISA and Mastercard, finding that
many chapter 7 debtors have the ability to pay back some of their debts).
15
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy
for a Test Drive:
Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 27 (1999) (disputing the
Vias/Mastercard study by finding that only 3.6% of debtors are “Can-Pays”); Theresa Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook. Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of
Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (1994) (using micro-data gathered from case
files to establish that debtors in 1991 are even less well off than in 1981 – contradicting the argument that
the increase in bankruptcy filings is due to abuse as the result of bankruptcy losing its “stigma”); Elizabeth
Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis,73 IND. L.J. 1079 (1998) (data show that more debt, not more abuse,
explains the rise in filings).
16
By the bankruptcy system, I mean that group of locally organized semi-autonomous groups involving
bankruptcy bench, bar, trustee’s office, commercial actors, potential clients. For more on this institutional
description of the bankruptcy system see Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems at 520-22.
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inputs and outputs. Because of this non-linear character, complex systems are difficult to
regulate exogenously (i.e. from the outside) and exogenous attempts at regulation often
have unpredictable results.17 Perhaps contrary to our expectations, non-linearities in a
complex system tend to generate patterns rather than random behavior. These patterns
(or “attractors” in the language of dynamical systems) are thus said to be a product of
self-organizing dynamics.18
The general approach of my research has been to study bankruptcy using the
methodological tools made available by complexity science.19 I am interested in
measuring quantitatively those patterns that emerge in legal content at bankruptcy’s trial
court level.20 As I have noted elsewhere, bankruptcy provides an excellent field for the
study of self-organizing dynamics because institutional conditions limit exogenous
ordering.21 BAPCPA to one side, Congressional ordering of bankruptcy law is relatively
infrequent. And institutional elements combined with practical concerns have made the
usual mechanisms of appellate court control relatively under-utilized in the bankruptcy
context.22
The present Article applies complex systems research methods to explore whether
debtors abuse the bankruptcy system. Rather than focusing on the demographic
characteristics of the debtor population, this study asks whether patterns for controlling
17

Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).
18
PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996); JULIEN
CLINTON SPROTT, CHAOS AND TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS (2003). My work on business cramdowns
valuations is an example of a study that traces patterns wrought by a complex self-organizing legal system.
Trujillo, Patterns, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2005).
19
Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483 (2004); Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex
System, 53 UCLA L. REV. --- (forthcoming Dec. 2005).
20
UCLA, spot cite and parenthetical
21
Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems, at 492-98; UCLA spot cite
22
But see sec. 1233 of BAPCPA, authorizing direct appeals from bankruptcy court to Courts of Appeals. It
will be important to observe how this direct appeals provision is used in the future, and how it might affect
the dynamics of the bankruptcy system.
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abuse have emerged among bankruptcy courts.
As we will see in Part III, substantial patterns have emerged in the property
exemption phase of consumer chapter 7 cases that act effectively to minimize abuse.
Through a dynamics of self-organization, the bankruptcy system has developed
important, if unheralded, gate-keeping procedures. The existence and efficacy of these
procedures substantially undercuts the logic of BAPCPA and the blame-the-borrower
school of bankruptcy policy analysts.
To paraphrase the late, great Johnnie Cochran: “If they lose, it’s not abuse!” The
data show that, where “can-pay” debtors do file for bankruptcy, a funny thing happens on
the way to the discharge: sophisticated debtors “lose”, at the level of exemptions
valuation, in great proportions. Before laying out the data, Part II of this Article will
present an empirically testable frame to the hypothesis that sophisticated debtors abuse
the bankruptcy system.

II. TESTING THE ABUSE HYPOTHESIS

This part lays out a matrix for how we might put the abuse argument to the
empirical test. First, I will specify the notion of “abuse” in a way that can be measured.
Then I will examine the law, procedure, and policy surrounding property exemptions in
chapter 7 consumer bankruptcies. Finally, I will offer a testable

howing how

bankruptcy courts’ valuation of exemption claims acts as a control parameter that allows
the system to monitor and minimize the amount of potential abuse. This part will
conclude with some predictions of what we would see if the abuse hypothesis was true.
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A. Defining Abuse Quantitatively
Consumer debtors file for bankruptcy in order to acquire the state-provided
“good” we call the discharge.23 It is perhaps useful to regard the discharge as a sort of
public resource that is managed by the state for public benefit. As with all public
resources, the state can manage the discharge in a way that redounds to the social good,
or in a way that damages the social good by spending a public resource to line private
pockets. A municipality can spend a fund of public money on a waterworks project that
benefits the community. Or it can invest that fund in a program of graft (perhaps
unbeknownst to the public officials managing the money) that amounts to a social cost.
We understand every dollar that is discharged in a consumer chapter 7 case to be
either a social benefit or a social cost. Discharging a dollar owed by a debtor who cannot
repay is a social benefit – this is the “fresh start” policy that animates consumer
bankruptcy law. Discharging a dollar owed by a debtor who can repay is a social cost – it
is an instance of a public good being distributed for private gain only.
We can thus quantify “abuse” as the number of 7 discharged can-pay dollars –
that is, debt discharged in a chapter 7 liquidation by a consumer who could have repaid
the debt if she had executed a plan of repayment under chapter 13 or restructured her debt
obligations outside of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy abuse, by this definition, is every dollar of
discharge that constitutes a social cost. It follows that the proper use of bankruptcy is
every dollar of discharge that constitutes a social benefit.

23

A debt is discharged when it becomes legally uncollectible after the bankruptcy case is terminated.
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B. Exemptions in Consumer Bankruptcy
A central part of every consumer 7 bankruptcy is the law’s specification of what
among the debtor’s property shall be declared exempt and thus held beyond the reach of
the creditors. How much the debtor benefits from the discharge, and thus whether it will
benefit the debtor to proceed with the liquidation at all, will often depend on the outcome
of the exemptions phase of the case.
Exemptions are a creature of state debt collections law and federal bankruptcy
law. Exemptions statutes protect certain types of property (e.g. the family Bible, a burial
plot) and types of property in certain amounts (e.g. $1,200 worth of car, $7,500 worth of
tools-of-the-debtor’s-trade), holding the exempt property beyond the reach of debt
collection. The logic behind exemptions law is that every person is entitled to some stuff,
no matter how much debt they pile up.
A chapter 7 petition authorizes the trustee24 to seize and liquidate the debtor’s
non-exempt assets and distribute the proceeds (if any) to the creditors. Statutory
exemptions thus maximize the value of the discharge to the debtor by preventing the
seizure of property. Procedurally, the debtor submits a list of property she claims as
exempt, along with valuations of each item. The trustee reviews the list. If the trustee
objects to a particular exemption (and if the debtor and trustee cannot settle the matter)
then the exemption will be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court.
Imagine a consumer who has a lot of debts and a 1995 Dodge Neon. The
consumer wants to lose the debts and keep the Neon. Prior to BAPCPA, she had the
option of filing (without submitting to a means-test) a chapter 7 petition and a schedule

24

A chapter 7 trustee is an administrative officer of the bankruptcy court whose job is to administer the
assets of the mass of chapter 7 consumer bankruptcies.
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claiming the Neon as exempt property. Suppose the governing exemption statute allows
debtors to exempt $1,200 worth of car. The debtor would list the Neon’s value at, say,
$1,000. If the trustee does not object, the debtor keeps the Neon and gets the discharge.
Now suppose that the car is a 2005 Mercedes convertible with quad DVD players,
self-cleaning ashtrays, and fuzzy dice. The statutory exemption amount is still $1,200.
Any attempt by the debtor to exempt this car at or below the statutory amount will surely
fetch an objection from the trustee and potentially an adjudicated valuation by the court.
A debtor can “lose” at the exemptions valuation proceeding in at least two ways.
First, the judge may deny the exemption and authorize the trustee to seize the asset and
sell it. In the Mercedes example, the trustee would seize the car and sell it, give $1,200 to
the debtor and the balance to the creditors.25 Second, the judge may allow the exemption,
but at a higher value than listed by the debtor. If the found value of the asset is higher
than the exemption amount, the debtor is forced to make a payment to the trustee in order
to avoid seizure. In either case, the debtor is forced to pay more for the discharge, and
the creditors realize the gain.
The administration of exemptions is a significant component in determining whether the
discharge produces a social gain or a social cost. It is thus important to specify how
exemptions are implemented in the bankruptcy system. Earlier studies that have
accounted for property exemptions tend to treat the exemption as if it were a nonadjusting variable that could only be raised or lowered exogenously.26 The present study
25

This calculation assumes that there is no security interest in the car. Alternatively, assume a lien in the
car securing a debt of $20,000 and a liquidation price of $30,000. After liquidation, the trustee would
distribute the first $20,000 to the secured party, the next $1,200 to the debtor in satisfaction of the
exemption amount, and the balance to the creditors.
26
See Barry Adler, Ben Polak, and Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 585, 608-09 (2000): “…when the borrower has assets to protect, he will work
harder to avoid bankruptcy. Consequently, raising the personal exemption level would reduce ex ante
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approaches exemptions in the context of their implementation by bankruptcy system
actors.

C. A

of Exemptions Valuation as a Control on Abuse
I have argued that the bankruptcy system uses exemptions valuation to calibrate

the amount of the discharge, thus controlling abuse. Using the language of dynamical
systems, we can say that the exemptions valuation acts as a “control parameter” on the
amount of potential abuse. The relationship between the control parameter and abuse is
represented in Figure 1.

efficiency. On the other hand, lowering the exemption level reduces the amount of wage insurance that the
bankruptcy system provides.” This passage well-frames the tradeoffs. But it mistakenly treats the
exemptions value as a flat, non-adjusting variable. When we see how exemptions are administered by
bankruptcy-qua-complex system, we see the exemption value adjust to maximize benefits (more “wage
insurance” for the can’t-pays) and minimize costs (less “inefficiency,” i.e. less social costs lost to the canpays). As we will see in Part III, exemptions values, as deployed by bankruptcy system actors, are elastic
and correlated to debtor status: taking a high value to diminish the value of the discharge for can-pays, and
taking a low value to increase the value of the discharge for can’t-pays. See also Richard Hynes, Anup
Malani, and Eric Posner, The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J. LAW & ECON. 19
(2004) (establishing that an inference from exemption amounts to filing rates is unconvincing). The
research limitations identified by Hynes, Malani, and Posner may be overcome in the context of a “field
experiment” that studies exemptions, as it were, in the field of their actual implementation. See generally
Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, Field Experiments, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 1009 (2004). The present study
perhaps moves us in the direction of such a “field experiment.”
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Figure 1
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The y axis represents the social benefit and social cost of the discharge. The x axis,
labeled “success,” represents the degree to which the debtor was successful at the
exemptions valuation proceeding. The four points on the graph can be summarized as:
Can-Pay
0
0
1
1

Successful
1
0
0
1

Social Benefit
Missed opportunity
Dodged a bullet
Social Cost

A debtor represented as “01” is a “can’t-pay” who was successful in her exemption
valuation hearing. We can offer this situation as the proper use of bankruptcy, in that it
distributes the public resource of the discharge in a way that redounds to the public good.
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A debtor represented as “00” is a “can’t pay” who was unsuccessful in her exemption
valuation hearing. More value directed to this person’s discharge would have been a
social benefit, but the bankruptcy system missed that opportunity. A debtor represented
as “10” is a “can pay” who was unsuccessful at the exemption hearing. Any value
flowing to this debtor would constitute a social cost, but the system minimized the
amount of that cost. Finally, a debtor denoted as “11” is a “can pay” who wins at the
exemption hearing. This is abuse – a debtor who can pay getting the maximum value for
her discharge.
Suppose that Figure 1 is a “miniature

” course, and each of the four plotted

points is a hole. The ground is sloped that that any ball dropped onto the course will
ultimately find its way into a hole. Imagine that we stand on a platform above the course
and dump 1,000

balls. We then count how many balls were collected in each of the

four holes. Suppose we repeat this experiment 1,000 times, and then calculate the results.
If the abuse hypothesis of BAPCPA and the blame-the-borrower school were
correct, we would see either no pattern at all (i.e. a random distribution of how many
balls were collected by each hole, indicating that the bankruptcy system was exerting no
order over debtors’ application for discharges) or we would see a pattern favoring hole
“11” (i.e. that can-pay debtors are maximizing value from the discharge and the system is
being abused).
Neither of these predictions is supported by the data. Instead, we see patterns
favoring hole “01” (maximized social benefit) and hole “10” (minimized social cost).
The system sorts debtors, and it sorts them to maximize social benefits and minimize
social costs associated with the discharge.
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III. STUDY RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Part II argued that bankruptcy courts’ valuation of exemptions is a key component
in the process of monitoring and controlling debtors’ alleged abuse of the discharge.
Measuring exemptions data, therefore, is critical to understanding what, if anything,
courts are doing about abuse.
This Part presents the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy court valuations
in consumer exemptions proceedings. The question of this study: What have bankruptcy
court opinions signaled27 about sophisticated debtors’ chances of success?
If the “abuse” argument were true, we would expect to see no correlation between
sophistication and success, indicating that courts were expending no particular effort to
rein in debtors’ attempted abuse, or even a positive correlation indicating that that
sophisticated debtors were maximizing the value of their discharge at the exemptions
hearing. In fact, we see a strong negative correlation between debtors’ sophistication and
their success. The data show that the presence of sophistication reduces a debtor’s
chance of success by as much as 87.8%. Courts seem to have systematically valued
exemptions to smack the “can-pay” debtor.
More generally, these data offer some support for a claim that the bankruptcy
legal system, through a dynamics of self-organization, adjusts to monitor and minimize
abuse by sophisticated debtors. If the premise of the BAPCPA was that Congress had to
27

See Trujillo, PATTERNS n-n, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (discussing the “communications
effects” of a published bankruptcy court opinion). These data (published bankruptcy court cases) are
appropriate to the research question because the published opinion stands as a signal par excellence to the
other members of the trial court network (including trustee, bar, and potential debtor population) regarding
the likely disposition of future disputes. This ex officio signaling affects the administrative behavior of the
trustee’s office, the counseling behavior of the bar, and the filing behavior of the debtor population.
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step in because the bankruptcy system was not acting to control abuse, that premise is
disproved by these data. The BRA may turn out to be a clumsy exogenous attempt to
achieve what the Br system was already accomplishing to in a more complex fashion.28

A. Study design
The data for this Article are drawn from reported opinions of U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts in consumer exemptions proceedings that contain a judicial valuation of at least
one asset. The database consists of 540 observations drawn from 394 published opinions
reported in the Westlaw computer database.29 These cases were decided in three periods
of three years each: 1980-1982, 1988-1990, and 1995-1997.30 Law students, working

28

Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).
29
The Westlaw search terms used to acquire the cases were “DA(AFT 1979 & BEF 1983) & SY,DI
(51K2761 51K2771 51K2772 51K2773 51K2774 51K2775 51K2776 51K2777 51K2778 51K2779
51K2780 51K2781 51K2782 51K2793 163K31 163K32 163K33 163K34 163K35 163K36 163K37
163K39 163K40 163K41 163K42 163K43 163K44 163K45 163K47 163K48 163K49 163K50 163K52)”,
“DA(AFT 1987 & BEF 1991) & SY,DI (51K2761 51K2771 51K2772 51K2773 51K2774 51K2775
51K2776 51K2777 51K2778 51K2779 51K2780 51K2781 51K2782 51K2793 163K31 163K32 163K33
163K34 163K35 163K36 163K37 163K39 163K40 163K41 163K42 163K43 163K44 163K45 163K47
163K48 163K49 163K50 163K52),” and “DA(AFT 1994 & BEF 1998) & SY,DI (51K2761 51K2771
51K2772 51K2773 51K2774 51K2775 51K2776 51K2777 51K2778 51K2779 51K2780 51K2781
51K2782 51K2793 163K31 163K32 163K33 163K34 163K35 163K36 163K37 163K39 163K40 163K41
163K42 163K43 163K44 163K45 163K47 163K48 163K49 163K50 163K52)” in the library “fbkr-bct”.
Opinions of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels were disregarded, leaving only opinions of Bankruptcy Courts.
This term yields a list of 709 cases; 194 cases for the period 1980-1982, 260 cases for the period 19881990, and 255 cases for the period 1995-1997. This list generated 540 observations, reported in 394 cases.
Observations consist of a reported valuation of an asset by a court. Where a single case reported valuations
of multiple assets, each asset was coded as a separate observation. The earliest observation in the database
is from January 14, 1980. The latest observation is from December 22, 1997. The database contains
consumer exemptions cases only, and is not designed to capture any “substantial abuse” cases under old
section 707(b) of the Code. The findings (i.e. that sophisticated debtors are unsuccessful) is strengthened
because the correlation arises in pure exemptions cases. If the database had included cases where the abuse
issue was already framed, we would expect to see more observations correlating sophistication with a lack
of success.
30
Of the 540 observations, 486 (exactly 90%) occurred in the context of a Chapter 7 filed by a consumer
debtor. 42 observations (7.78%) occurred in Chapter 13 cases, 8 observations (1.48%) occurred in Chapter
11 cases, and 4 observations (0.74%) occurred in Chapter 12 cases. All of these cases, including the “plan”
bankruptcy cases in Chapters 11, 12, and 13, involved debtors who claimed personal exemptions and
sought a judicial valuation. Typically the point of the valuation was to allow the exemption. Occasionally,
the point of the valuation was to specify whether and how much of a lien may be avoided under 522(f). In
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closely with me, coded each observation according to a coding instrument.31 Following
the initial coding, a substantial portion of the observations was re-coded by a different
law student to test for reliability.32
An important limitation of this database is the fact that the observations are drawn
entirely from published cases.33 These observations are evidence of what the bankruptcy
courts’ are signaling about the likely disposition of future disputes. They are not
evidence of debtors’ post-discharge economic status. All codes in the database proceed
from opinions written by judges, thus everything in the database is filtered through the
judge’s interpretation. These are not unvarnished facts, but the facts that the judge chose
to write about in the way she chose to write about them.
Additional limitations of the database include the possibility that the computer
search failed to identify relevant cases, that Westlaw misclassified some relevant cases,
and that the coding process registered some “false negatives” (i.e. failing to classify an
item as an “observation” despite the presence of a reported judicial valuation). Finally,
these data comprise only three samples of three years each from the period after the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code through about 1998. Thus, while this database

the “plan” cases, the exemption hearing was often used to exempt an asset (or a portion of the asset) from
the estate in order to clarify payments under the plan.
31
See infra Appendix (describing how reader can access a copy of the Coding Instrument). See generally
HERBERT JACOB, USING PUBLISHED DATA: ERRORS AND REMEDIES (1984, vol. 42, Sage series on
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences) (discussing methodology generally applicable to this
study); ROBERT PHILLIP WEBER, BASIC CONTENT ANALYSIS (1990, vol. 49, Sage series on Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences) (same).
32
See Appendix, (presenting reliability statistics). An Appendix containing documents important for the
replication of this study shall be maintained on the author’s website. Please contact the author at
brtrujil@wisc.edu for more information. Appendix shall include: (i) Reliability statistics; (ii) the logistic
regression
used to generate Figure 10; (iii) the caselist; (iv) the Coding Instrument; and (v) the database.
Seegenerally PAUL E. SPECTOR, SUMMATED RATING SCALE CONSTRUCTION: AN INTRODUCTION, 65-67
(1992).
33
An alternative term for “published” cases would be “available” cases. These cases all appear in the
Westlaw electronic database. It is possible that some of them did not appear in print in the Westlaw
published BANKRUPTCY REPORTER.
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provides a broad sample of roughly 20 years of bankruptcy doctrine, the data are still
only a sample of a larger population.
I will present some of the general features of the database, and then explain the
major variables used for the statistical

.

B. General Characteristics of the Database
Figure 2 presents the distribution of cases by year during the sample periods.

Figure 2
Frequency of Cases by Year
Year

Frequency

Percentage

1980
1981
1982
1988
1989
1990
1995
1996
1997
TOTAL

32
43
39
67
76
79
65
56
83
540

5.93
7.96
7.22
12.41
14.07
14.63
12.04
10.37
15.37
100.00

3 periods of 3 years each
1980, 1981, 1982
1988, 1989, 1990
1995, 1996, 1997

Figure 3 shows the distribution of observations, based on whether the debtor was a
couple or, if single, the debtor’s gender.
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Figure 3
Frequency of Debtor by Couple and Gender
Gender
Male
Female
Couple
TOTAL

Frequency
186
77
277
540

Percentage
34.44
14.26
51.30
100.00

The observations are roughly evenly divided between single filers (263) and couples
(277). For the sample periods, male single filers outnumber female single filers by more
than two-to-one.
Figure 4 shows the types of assets that were adjudicated in the exemptions
proceedings.
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Figure 4
Frequency of Asset Type
Type of Asset

Frequency

Percentage

Cash
Personal Transportation
Vehicle
Homestead, non-mobile
Homestead, mobile
Tools of the Trade:
Motor Vehicle
Farm Equipment
Farm Produce
Farm Real Estate
Non-Farm Real Estate
Non-Farm Blue Collar
Non-Farm White Collar
Farm Animals
Household Goods:
Guns
Mobile Home (Not Homestead)
Jewelry
Clothing
Furniture
Other
Motor Boat

311

57.59

30
81
3

5.56
15.00
0.56

7
21
2
1
2
7
6
2

1.30
3.89
0.37
0.19
0.37
1.30
1.11
0.37

7
1
11
2
4
41
1

1.30
0.19
2.04
0.37
0.74
7.59
0.19

TOTAL

540

100.00

C. Variables
Our dependent variable (that is, the thing we are trying to explain) is the debtor’s
success in the exemption proceeding. We define success in two ways: narrowly and
broadly.
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Success, narrowly defined, occurred when the debtor won the adjudicated
exemption, and failure occurred when the court denied the debtor that exemption.34
Figure 5 presents the frequency of debtor success, narrowly defined.
Figure 5
Frequency of Debtor Success, Narrowly Defined
Success

Frequency

Percentage

Debtor denied exemption (Failure)
Debtor takes exemption (Success)

157
236

39.95
60.05

TOTAL

393

100.00

We also define debtor success more broadly to include all observations of the
narrow definition, plus 128 instances where the debtor won the exception, but the court
limited the amount of the exemption, typically because the court adjudicated a limit
imposed by another statute (e.g. limits on worker’s compensation, or amount exemptible
in community property; adjudicates how much of an income tax refund is exemptible
based on filing data).35 Figure 6 presents the frequency of debtor success, broadly
defined.

34

There were 393 observations of debtor success, narrowly defined. These include 9 observations of
success in 522(f) adjudications, where the debtor was found to have a right to an exemption and allowed to
avoid a lien to the extent that it impaired that exemption. See Code 522(f).
35
Limiting an exemption in this way is not an operation of the “control parameter” in the way we have
defined it. See supra Part II.
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Figure 6
Frequency of Debtor Success, Broadly Defined
Success

Frequency

Percentage

Debtor denied exemption (Failure)
Debtor takes exemption OR
debtor takes the exemption but is
limited in amount (Success)

157

30.13

364

69.87

TOTAL

521

100.00

Our explanatory variables (or “independent variables”) include whether the debtor
is filing singly or jointly, what kind of asset is the subject matter of the exemption (e.g. a
cash instrument such as a bank account or annuity, a home, a car, tools, etc.), what party
initiated the proceeding (the trustee, the debtor, or a creditor), and the debtor’s
“sophistication.” An observation was coded as “debtor sophisticated” only if there was
clear evidence in the opinion that the debtor possessed the means to exit the usual highvolume track of bankruptcy administration, and instead had utilized attorney services and
financial planners to execute a tailor-made strategy for maximizing post-discharge
personal wealth.36 An observation was coded as “debtor unsophisticated” only if there

36

See e.g., Heitkamp v. Dyke, 99 B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 1989) (“The debtor, Marshall James Dyke,
M.D., filed for relief under Chapter 7 on October 1, 1987. The debtor is the sole shareholder and director of
a professional association known as the Conroe Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic. The debtor has sought to
prevent the trustee, on behalf of the estate's creditors, from reaching the debtor's interest in a pension plan
titled the Conroe Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic, P.A., Pension Plan and Trust (Pension Plan). The debtor is
the sole trustee of the Pension Plan, and his interest in it, which is 95 percent vested, amounts to
$1,170,000.”).
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was clear evidence in the opinion that the debtor lacked the means to maximize
strategically her gains from the discharge.37
Figure 7 shows the distribution of debtors coded as sophisticated and
unsophisticated.

Figure 7
Debtor Sophistication
Sophistication

Frequency

Percentage

Clearly Sophisticated
Clearly Unsophisticated
Data did not support
assigning a code

92
51

17.04
9.44

397

73.52

TOTAL

540

100.00

We are especially interested in the statistical relationship between the debtor’s
sophistication and success. Figures 8 and 9 show the relationship between sophistication
and success for the data observed in the sample. The Figures include simple tests for
significance, showing a statistically significant relationship between Sophistication and a
lack of Success.38

37

See e.g., In re Thompson, 103 B.R. 205 (Bankr. W.D. Missouri, 1989) (“Debtor has a high school degree
through G.E.D., suffers from a blood disease (Porphyria Cutanea Tardia) which is congenital and has no
known cure, owns nothing but a partially paid for pickup truck, minimal household furnishings and
clothing, and has no substantial prospects for an increase in income except what he receives as a result of
union negotiated contracts with his employer. Debtor presently makes $13.47 per hour, has no insurance
with substantial cash value, no annuities and only the anticipation of social security benefits plus income
from the fund at the time of retirement.”).
38
These simple bi-variate analyses are confirmed in the multi-variate analysis of Figure 10.
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Figure 8
Debtor Success (Broadly Defined) by Sophistication
Debtor Success (Broadly Defined)
No
Yes
TOTAL
Debtor Sophistication
Not Sophisticated
Sophisticated
TOTAL

8 (17.39)
40 (44.44)
48 (35.29)

38 (82.61)
50 (55.56)
88 (64.71)

46 (100.00)
90 (100.00)
136 (100.00)

Note: row percentages in parentheses
Pearson chi2(1) = 9.7555 Pr = 0.002

Figure 9
Debtor Success (Narrowly Defined) by Sophistication
Debtor Success (Narrowly Defined)
No
Yes
TOTAL
Debtor Sophistication
Not Sophisticated
Sophisticated
TOTAL

8 (21.05)
40 (52.63)
48 (42.11)

30 (78.95)
36 (47.37)
66 (57.89)

38 (100.00)
76 (100.00)
114 (100.00)

Note: row percentages in parentheses
Pearson chi2(1) = 10.3636 Pr = 0.001

D. Regressions and Interpretations of Results
We use a logistic regression
1). The details of the

for a binary dependent variable (success = 0 or

are presented in the Appendix. Figure 10 reports the results of

two regressions, one the broad definition of success and one for the narrow definition of
success.39

39

Figure 10 includes Cash as one of the independent variables but, because of multicollinearity effects,
does not contain Home (n = 15). Regressions containing Home are maintained on authors website. See
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Figure 10
Results: Binary Logit

of Success

Debtor Success,
Broadly Defined

Debtor Success
Narrowly Defined

Sophistication

-1.810 (0.534) **
[0.164]

-2.104 (0.600) **
[0.122]

Creditor, Entity

-0.787 (0.754)
[0.455]

-0.476 (0.806)
[0.621]

Creditor, Nonentity

0.849 (1.276)
[2.338]

-0.831 (1.513)
[0.436]

Trustee initiated

-0.766 (0.790)
[0.465]

-0.663 (0.870)
[0.515]

Debtor Initiated

0.024 (0.837)
[1.024]

-0.999 (0.876)
[0.368]

Debtor is a couple

-1.178 (0.450) **
[0.308]

-1.530 (0.532) *
[0.216]

Tools

-0.381 (0.937)
[0.683]

0.223 (0.968)
[1.250]

Vehicle

-3.968 (1.459)
[0.019]

Cash

-1.277 (0.665)
[0.279]

-1.269 (0.714)
[0.281]

Log Likelihood

-69.745203

-58.450987

BIC
Psuedo-R2

-450.408
0.1659

-335.452
0.1736

Observations

131

106

Variable

Standard error in parentheses; Odds ratios in brackets

Appendix re: documents maintained on author’s website. The standard error for Vehicle suggests that the
result for that independent variable is not reliable.
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In this

, we see an odds ratio40 for Sophistication is 0.164 (broad success) and

0.122 (narrow success). This means that the presence of Sophistication reduced the
chance of broad success by 83.6%, and reduces the chance of narrow success by 87.8%.
This result is significant at the one percent level.
We also see that when the debtor is a couple, the chances of Success are reduced
by 69.2% (broad) and 78.4% (narrow), and this result is also significant at the one percent
level.

E. Discussion
We find that the presence of sophistication drastically reduces the chance of
success, and the presence of unsophistication dramatically increases the chances of
success. This finding undermines the empirical basis of BAPCPA, and suggests that the
bankruptcy system has developed patterns to control abuse of the discharge.
The finding is open to one important criticism: It is possible that there are
unmeasured observations where sophisticated debtors were successful (and unmeasured
observations where unsophisticated debtors were unsuccessful). Put another way, it is
possible that judges only mentioned the debtors’ high sophistication when the judges
were prepared to find against the debtor, and that there are cases where the judge found in
favor of sophisticated debtors, but chose not to mention anything about the debtors’

40

An “odds ratio” of 1 means the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable. An odds
ratio of “2” means the presence of the independent variable doubles the likelihood of the presence of the
dependent variable. An odds ratio of 0.5 means the presence of the indpendent variable halves the chances
that the dependent variable will occur.
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sophistication. This is a problem in measurement known as “unmeasured
heterogeneity.”41
To ameliorate this potential problem, we need to produce evidence suggesting that
the unmeasured observations did not behave in the opposite manner from the
observations that we did measure. Figures 11 and 12 show that, when comparing the
group that we were able to code with those that we were unable to code, there is no
different in success (narrow and broad).
Figure 11
Success (Broadly Defined) by Whether Sophistication was Coded
Success
Sophistication
Not Coded

Failure
109
(28.31%)

Success
276
(71.69%)

Total
385

Coded

48
(35.29%)

88
(64.71%)

136

Total

157

364

X2 = 2.3273
Pr = 0.127

41

See generally, James W. Vaupel & Anatoli I. Yashin, Heterogeneity’s Ruses: Some Surprising Effects of
Selection on Population Dynamics, 39 AM. STATISTICIAN 176 (1985).
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Figure 12
Success (Narrowly Defined) by Whether Sophistication was Coded
Success
Sophistication
Not Coded

Failure
109
(39.07%)

Success
170
(60.93%)

Total
279

Coded

48
(42.11%)

66
(57.89%)

114

Total

157

236

X2 = 0.3112
Pr = 0.577
Specifically, Figures 11 and 12 show that the uncoded observations are not
statistically significantly different from the coded observations. The distribution of
values in the Success variable was roughly the same across both coded and uncoded
observations. 42 This is at least partial evidence that the observations that we did not
measure did not behave differently from the observations that we did measure.43
The other significant finding is the correlation between couples-as-debtors and
failure at the exemption proceeding. We find that single filers stand a significantly
greater chance of succeeding in an exemptions claim than joint filers. This is true despite
the fact that singles tend to be more sophisticated, as is shown in Figure 13.

42

Thanks to Peter Carstensen and Bob Lawless for help on this point.
We can offer an educated guess that the observations we did not measure were most likely the “typical”
cases of debtor with no particular sophistication receiving the discharge as a matter of administration. Such
cases are unremarkable and unremarked upon, and so never rose to the level of adjudication that would put
them in our database.

43
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Figure 13
Sophistication by Debtor Filing Status
Sophistication
Debtor Filing
Status
Debtor is not Couple
Debtor is Couple
Total

Not Sophisticated
20
(25.97%)

Sophisticated
57
(74.03%)

Total
77

31
(46.97%)

35
(53.05%)

66

51

92

143

X2 = 6.8277**
Pr = 0.009

We see that, if the debtor is a couple, their chances of being sophisticated are about
50/50. But if the debtor is single, the chance of being sophisticated goes up to 74/26. So
the finding that couples are unsuccessful is not just a necessary corollary to the finding
that sophisticates are unsuccessful.44
More generally, the data offer preliminary support for the claim that the
bankruptcy legal system has self-organized to maximize the social benefit of the
discharge and to minimize the social cost. Put another way, the system developed
patterns to control abuse, contrary to the empirical assertions of BAPCPA and its
proponents.

44

More work must be done to specify the potential correlation between couples and failure. One
preliminary theory for why judges might be harder on couples than singles is demographic: there is some
sociological evidence that marriage acts as a risk-spreading device and that unmarried consumers are thus
in greater need of receiving the support of a social safety net in the form of the discharge. But see Warren
and Tyagi (arguing that two-income couples double their risk of failure caused by job loss.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD A “NO-FAULT” APPROACH TO DEBT REGULATION

There appears to be no empirical support for the claim that bankruptcy abuse
explains increased filing rates. What, then, explains the dramatic rise in bankruptcies? If
blame-the-borrower does not work, how about blame-the-lender?
The not-so-secret dirty little secret of the bankruptcy reform legislation is that it
has been motivated by something weightier and more fundamental than Congress’
yearning for a more financially responsible middle class. The largely unspoken premise
of BAPCPA was that bankruptcy, because it bars collection efforts on discharged debts,
had made too expensive the lenders’ project of market expansion. Lenders want to
expand the lending market. They want to lend more money through more instruments to
more borrowers. And they want to shift the risks of this market expansion away from
themselves.
I would like, for the moment, to put to one side what is obviously lenders’ self
interest in this project of market expansion and cost shifting. Instead, I would like to
offer a bare assertion: suppose there is something structural about the consumer credit
phenomena that we have observed in the last several years. Innovations in, and access to,
consumer credit have undergone a rapid evolution. It seems unlikely that these forms
will simply fade into the shadows, leaving society and economy as once it was. Rather
than hankering after an imagined equilibrium, it is a more pressing task for lawyers and
regulators to measure and comprehend the far-from-equilibrium system we possess.
I would like to close by suggesting two arguments by analogy: health care and
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accidents. David Cutler’s recent work45 traces a progression of comprehending health
care as a structural change in the U.S. economy. Analyses of health care (and consumer
credit) conventionally begin with the observation that we are consuming much more of it
than we used to. Suggested remedies often involve some form of rationing – force
providers to bear more risks, price more consumers out of the market. Cutler’s “Aha!”
moment came when he realized that perhaps the U.S. economy is consuming the right
amount of health care, even if that amount is much more than it was even a short time
ago. The task for regulators then becomes adapting old institutions to new phenomena,
rather than trimming the consumption of health care to pre-surge levels.
Gudio Calabresi’s classic Costs of Accidents begins with the understanding that
horse and buggy accidents law is insufficient to the task of regulating a complex system
characterized by a new transportation form called the automobile.46 In the system in
which we live, accidents happen so frequently as to utterly overwhelm a case-by- case,
who’s-at-fault method of cost settlement. Calabresi’s work beckoned us to look beyond
the point-to-point linearities and turn to a system-wide investigation of patterns recurrent
in the mass of data, patterns that can be regulated and controlled. Thirty-five years after
Costs of Accidents, our institutions have changed but our habits of mind remain the same.
New technologies of transportation, new forms of consumable services and
finance pass through a system, dominating it, re-characterizing it. And the first job of the
regulator is to see what is there.

45
46

DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE (2004).
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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